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Does Europe still have an ambition in defence beyond 
that of its academics, i.e. to write papers about it? When 
the President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rompuy, put an assessment of “the state of defence in 
Europe” on the agenda of the Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the European Union (EU),1 he definitely 
generated a new and very hectic round of producing 
papers. But he also successfully galvanized the debate 
and, potentially, turned it into a new direction. 
Does Europe Exist?
The fact is that we never examine “the state of defence 
in Europe”. In political terms we do continually refer to 
“Europe”. We expect “Europe” to do something about 
Libya, Mali, Syria etc. Because of the shift of its strate-
gic focus to Asia and the Pacific (the “pivot”), even the 
US has sent a clear message that “Europe” should as-
sume responsibility for the security of its own periph-
ery. For the Americans, “Europe” can mean the Euro-
pean allies of NATO, the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), or an ad hoc coalition of Euro-
pean states. Washington really no longer cares under 
which flag we act, as long as we act and the problem 
is dealt with without extensive American assets being 
drawn in. 
In terms of defence planning however, “Europe” does 
not really exist. We assess the state of the CSDP, of 
NATO’s military posture, and of course of each of our 
national armed forces. But we never assess Europe’s 
military effort in its entirety. In fact, we are unable to, 
simply because there is no forum where we set targets 
for “defence in Europe”. 2 For many Member States it is, apparently, such a small part of their forces that they seem to equate the CSDP with the Battle-
groups and have all but forgotten the Headline Goal. They also 
tend to forget that a Battlegroup is pretty much the numbers 
that the Brussels police will deploy during the actual European 
Council – hardly a level of ambition worthy of a continent.
On the one hand, we pretend that it is only a specific 
separable (and, in the minds of many capitals, small) 
part of our armed forces that can be dedicated to the 
CSDP and the achievement of its Headline Goal, de-
fined by the European Council in Helsinki in 1999: 
the capacity to deploy up to a corps of 60,000.2 That 
is a theoretical fiction. In reality any commitment to 
either the CSDP or NATO or both has an impact on 
one’s entire national armed forces. A decision to in-
vest in an air-to-air refuelling project through the EU’s 
European Defence Agency (EDA) for example implies 
that that sum cannot be spent in another capability 
area of importance for the CSDP or NATO or, usually, 
both, whereas once delivered the resulting air-to-air 
refuelling capability will be available for operations 
in either framework. Schemes to encourage states to 
join capability efforts, like the EU’s Pooling & Sharing 
and NATO’s Smart Defence, obviously can only make 
the most of opportunities to generate synergies and 
effects of scale if all arsenals are taken into the balance 
in their entirety. 
On the other hand, the NATO Defence Planning Proc-
ess (NDPP) supposedly does encompass (nearly) the 
whole of our forces, but it sets capability targets for 
individual nations in function of the targets of the Al-
liance as a whole, and does not separately define the 
level of ambition of NATO’s European pillar. Yet we 
know that significant additional capabilities will prob-
ably be generated by European allies collectively rather 
1 In his speech at the annual conference of the European De-
fence Agency on 22 March 2013; see http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/136394.pdf 
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than by European countries individually. As to opera-
tions, it becomes increasingly likely that in many sce-
narios European allies will have to act alone, without 
the United States. 
Defining Europe
A call to look at “the state of defence in Europe” thus 
implicitly is a call to first of all define a level of am-
bition for “Europe”, against which the existing capa-
bilities can then be assessed, shortfalls identified, and 
priority objectives defined. Put succinctly, the question 
is: why? Why does “Europe” want to have capabilities 
in the first place? 
As the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, stated 
at the outset of her Final Report Preparing the December 
2013 European Council on Security and Defence: clear-
ly this question ‘warrant[s] a strategic debate among 
Heads of State and Government. Such a debate at the 
top level must set priorities’.3 The key political ques-
tion that the European Council needs to address, be-
fore it can address any military-technical question, is 
for which types of contingencies in which parts of the 
world “Europe”, as a matter of priority, commits to as-
sume responsibility, and which capabilities it commits 
to that end. On the basis of the answer to that question 
all other dimensions of the European Council’s broad 
defence agenda can be tackled – absent that answer, 
Europe’s defence effort will still be left hanging in the 
air. It is often said for example that “Europe” needs 
its own strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refuelling 
and ISTAR. But to be able to do what? Air-policing in 
the Baltic? Air-to-ground campaigns in the Mediter-
ranean? Or even further afield? And at which scale? 
Without an answer to such questions, it is impossible 
to rationally design a sensible capability mix and de-
cide on priority capability projects. 
Yet, who is “Europe”? Who can define the level of am-
bition that serves as political guidance for operations 
undertaken and capabilities developed by Europeans 
through both NATO and the CSDP? There is today no 
institutionalised venue where Europeans can take de-
cisions about their posture in NATO and the CSDP 
simultaneously – it is always either/or. Under these 
circumstances, the European Council is the best op-
tion. It is of course an EU body, but they are our Heads 
of State and Government, meeting in an intergovern-
mental setting, adopting not binding law but political 
declarations, and that by unanimity. Surely they, if 
anybody, have the legitimacy to declare that they will 
consider the political guidance which they agree upon 
to guide their governments’ positions in both NATO 
and the CSDP. 
In political terms, “Europe” either means any European 
state, or an ad hoc coalition of some of these states, or, 
when they make foreign and security policy together 
(which alas they do not do systematically enough), the 
EU. What “Europe” does not mean in political terms, is 
the CSDP or NATO: these are instruments, at the serv-
ice of the makers of foreign and security policy. Instru-
ments, moreover, both of which “Europe” is more likely 
to use in the near future than the US, in view of the 
“pivot”. Trying to define the exclusive remit of NATO or 
of the CSDP is absolutely useless therefore, for in either 
framework it will be the very same group of European 
countries that will be at the core of any initiative to un-
dertake military action. If Washington no longer takes 
the lead in setting strategy towards Europe’s neighbour-
hood, the only alternative actor is Europeans collective-
ly, i.e. the EU (for individually, no European state can 
defend all of its interests all of the time). The European 
Council thus really is the best placed to address “the 
state of defence in Europe” and define the level of ambi-
tion for the CSDP/the European pillar of NATO. 
This does not in any way prejudice how, in a real-life 
contingency, “Europe” will undertake military action: 
using NATO, the CSDP, the UN, ad hoc coalitions or 
a combination thereof. Indeed, if action entails larger-
scale combat operations, “Europe” will need the NATO 
command & control structure, which is its main asset 
and thus at the heart of its continued relevance. How-
ever, the best way to make sure that all instruments, 
military as well as civilian, are put to use in an inte-
grated way, from the planning of any type of action to 
the post-action and long-term involvement, is to politi-
cally put any intervention under the aegis of the EU, 
even when acting under national or NATO command 
in the case of military involvement. The fact is that in 
almost every scenario, the European Commission and 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) will ei-
ther from the start or eventually have to take charge of 
the political, economic and social dimension, regard-
less of how we address the military dimension – better 
to integrate all from the beginning therefore under the 
political aegis of the Union. Furthermore, that flag still 
is much less controversial whereas there always are 
countries and regions in which it is advised not to op-
erate under specific national flags or the NATO-label. 
In this context, creative use of Art. 44 of the Treaty on 
European Union, which is mentioned in passing in the 
High Representative’s report, can provide a flexible way 
of circumventing the political difficulties that contin-
ue to be an obstacle to effective coordination between 
NATO and the EU (or between ad hoc coalitions and 
the EU). Art. 44 allows the Council to entrust the imple-
mentation of an operation to a group of Member States. 
When a Member State or a coalition initiates an opera-
tion using a national or the NATO command structure, 
3 IOf 15 October 2013; see http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf
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“to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests” 
(Art. 42.5), thus placing it within the political aegis of 
the EU, but without detracting from the command & 
control exercised by the Member States involved, ex-
cept that they commit to “keep the Council regularly 
informed of [the operation’s] progress” (Art 44.2). The 
advantages would be manifold. The military dimen-
sion of an intervention can be fully integrated from the 
start with the political, economic and social dimension 
of which the EU is best placed to take charge (as op-
posed to the Libyan case, when the EU put itself out of 
the game and only came back in at a much later stage, 
thus losing a lot of time). The EU guise will do a lot to 
alleviate any suspicions of hidden national or NATO/
American agendas. And the Berlin Plus mechanism, 
designed to give the EU access to the NATO command 
structure but which in practice has proved far too rigid 
to use effectively or rapidly, can be avoided.
Defining Europe’s Priorities
That finally brings us to the question: what are the 
priorities for Europe as a security provider? Ashton’s 
report puts the emphasis on the broader neighbour-
hood, including not just the countries covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy but stretching out 
into the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. This is where 
according to Ashton “strategic autonomy must mate-
rialise first”. An unexpectedly bold statement, as is the 
assertion that the Union should be able “to act deci-
sively as a security provider”, “autonomously where 
necessary”, and “to protect its interests”, including by 
“projecting power” – certainly that last notion had not 
been read in an EU document before. 
The European Council should definitely build on this 
part of Ashton’s report, using the same strong word-
ing (to which Member States do not seem to have ob-
jected) and crafting it into a short and sharp paragraph 
for its conclusions. Otherwise, once the December 
meeting is behind us, Ashton’s report will have been 
just another preparatory document without any clear 
status. If on the other hand the Heads of State and 
Government would issue similarly worded conclu-
sions, they would offer strong political guidance for 
both NATO and the CSDP, ceating a level of ambition 
for the European pillar of NATO and updating the lev-
el of ambition as compared to the EU’s Headline Goal. 
“Strategic autonomy” in the broader neighbourhood 
(of which the Gulf really also is a part) should be read 
to mean that in this region Europe commits to take the 
lead in maintaining peace and security, i.e. to initiate 
the necessary response to security problems, includ-
ing prevention, as well as intervention, with partners 
if possible but alone if necessary. Further on Ashton’s 
report refers to the Maritime Security Strategy to be 
adopted in 2014, which should of course be integrated 
in the priorities. And should contributing to the collec-
tive security system of the UN not be a priority too, in 
line with the EU’s commitment to “effective multilat-
eralism”? All three priorities go hand in hand.
  
Defining the Military Level of Ambition 
The next step ought to be one that is curiously absent 
from the debate: if the European Council were to agree 
on priorities, these then have to be translated into a 
quantifiable military level of ambition. Which capa-
bilities are we willing to commit? How many troops 
do we want to be able to deploy and which permanent 
strategic reserve do we want to maintain? Which stra-
tegic enablers does this require? 
First, Europe needs a permanent strategic reserve: the 
ability to mount a decisive air campaign and to de-
ploy up to an army corps (the 60,000 of the Headline 
Goal), as a single force if necessary, for all types of op-
erations in Europe’s broader neighbourhood, over and 
above all on-going operations. This de facto “double 
Headline Goal” may seem fanciful, but it is but the 
reflection of the rate of deployment of the last decade. 
Second, it needs maritime power: the ability to achieve 
command of the sea in the broader neighbourhood, 
while maintaining a global naval presence in order 
to permanently engage with partners, notably in Asia 
and the Arctic. Finally, in the “post-pivot” era “strate-
gic autonomy” in the neighbourhood means acquir-
ing all strategic enablers, including air and maritime 
transport, air-to-air refuelling, and ISTAR, to allow for 
major army, air and naval operations in the broader 
neighbourhood without reliance on American assets. 
This is the nature of the decisions that need to be 
taken before a truly comprehensive “strategic level 
Defence Roadmap […] setting out specific targets and 
timelines”, as called for in Ashton’s report, can be de-
veloped. That can be a tasking to the EU Military Com-
mittee / EU Military Staff and to the EDA. 
With regard to short term objectives in such a roadmap, 
European governments now have to urgently make 
happen the 11 projects that the Foreign Affairs Council 
already prioritized, in December 2011. If we would im-
plement them, they would substantially address some 
of the key shortfalls qua strategic enablers. But none of 
them will materialize unless more countries contribute 
and contribute more – not just by sending staff officers 
to meetings but by co-financing. For the credibility of 
Europe in the eyes of our own public opinion as well as 
the US, it is crucial that in at least one major area a real 
project, i.e. with money attached, can be announced on 
the occasion of the European Council. Necessary though 
it may be, we don’t want to announce that a year’s prepa-
ration led only to the creation of “a process”. 
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As regards any roadmap’s longer term objectives, the 
updated level of ambition should be interpreted as a 
new starting point for the scenarios elaborated by the 
EUMS, on which Europe’s requirements catalogue 
is based, and thus also for the update of the EDA’s 
Capability Development Plan (CDP, expected by the 
autumn of 2014), of which the requirements cata-
logue constitutes the main strand. Starting from new 
assumptions, long-term priority capability objectives 
can be identified – the capabilities that we want to 
have in 20 to 30 years, which we have to start thinking 
about now. The targets that Europe collectively sets as 
a result of this process can be taken into account in 
the NDPP, thus constituting the middle level between 
national and NATO-wide defence planning, or the Eu-
ropean pillar, that is lacking today. 
The stark reality is though that until now most of the 
time most states make but paper commitments to 
NATO and the CSDP and that neither the NDPP nor 
the Headline Goal or the CDP have had much impact 
on national defence. This is why Ashton is right to also 
call for a “robust follow-up process”, including perhaps 
a “European semester on defence”. Without guaran-
tees that notably budgets allocated to collective capa-
bility projects will not be affected by future national 
budget cuts, the level of trust necessary to launch such 
projects in the first place cannot be achieved. Further-
more, we would do well not to discard the Commis-
sion’s ideas on funding dual use capabilities4  too eas-
ily – money should trump turf wars. The first element 
of follow-up should definitely be to report back to the 
European Council, perhaps in mid-2015, in order to 
maintain the current impetus.
Conclusion
The December 2013 European Council will surely not 
satisfy all expectations, which are very great – but then 
the challenge is great too. One should not over-do “ex-
pectations management” therefore, as some officials 
are prone to – if we are not allowed to expect anything, 
the European Council should not be meeting in the 
first place. In reality, putting defence on its agenda 
has already generated a new dynamic in the debate, 
including on ideas and notions which hitherto were 
not part of the official discussion. The conclusions 
on defence adopted by the Council on 25 November, 
leading up to the European Council meeting on 19-20 
December, are very long and cover many areas, but 
contain almost no actual decisions.  But the European 
Council can still adopt important political guidance on 
the level of ambition, and concrete taskings and dead-
lines to translate these into planning and scenarios, as 
well as decisions on the industrial base of European 
defence. And it will hopefully see the announcement 
of one or other real project. Taken together, this would 
already constitute a “roadmap light”, charting the way 
to a comprehensive roadmap on defence. 
4 In its July 2013 Communication A New Deal for European De-
fence. Towards a More Competititve and Efficient Defence and Se-
curity Sector. COM(2013)542/2; see http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/sectors/defence/files/communication_defence_en.pdf
5 One follow-up that these vague and often strangely formulated 
conclusions certainly invite is copy-editing. 
4 In its July 2013 Communication A New Deal for European De-
fence. Towards a More Competititve and Efficient Defence and Se-
curity Sector. COM(2013)542/2; see http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/sectors/defence/files/communication_defence_en.pdf
